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When analyzing the relationship between democracy and social exclusion in Latin America, the 
perspective prevails that emphasizes the contradictory nature of ‘formal democracies’ 
characterized by both deep social inequality and political and economic marginalization. 
However, when taking into account the astonishing durability of democracy in most Latin 
American countries it is time to shift the focus to incorporate the surprising compatibility of real-
existing Latin democracy with a highly exclusive social structure. Although confronted with 
grave economic, social and political crises, countries like Ecuador, Argentina and Bolivia have 
(so far) maintained their, howsoever precarious, democratic regimes. Drawing on the recent 
experience of the surprisingly quick restabilization seen in Argentina following its deep crisis in 
2001/2002, the article argues that it is the specific result of Latin America’s ‘double 
transformation’ (combining political liberalization and neo-liberal restructuring), which explains 
the central features of de- as well as re-stabilization. The combination of political 
democratization involving processes of economic crisis and their neo-liberal ‘resolution’ has 
socio-economic consequences that are, firstly, socio-politically destabilizing. Secondly, they 
hollow out democratic participation and representation by undermining the capacity for 
collective action on the part of broad sectors of society. Thirdly, however, it is this second 
implication — since it is the capacity for politically mobilizing precisely those harmed by the 
neo-liberal reforms and economic crises, which is being limited — that simultaneously operates 
in a politically stabilizing way. 
 
Keywords: Argentina; democracy; democratic civil peace; economic crisis; Latin 
America; social exclusion 
 
Introduction 
Some 25 years after the so-called ‘third wave of democratization’ reached Latin America it is 
now time to change perspective.
1 
Impressed by the widespread failure of Latin democracy in the 
1960s and 1970s, social scientific interest during the 1980s and 1990s focused — besides 
explaining the regime transition itself — on the precarious nature of the subcontinent’s new 
democracies. By revealing the obvious weaknesses, contradictions and deficiencies of political 
regimes, the survival of democracy was portrayed as being severely threatened. Following this 
2 
line of reasoning, four threat perceptions can be distinguished. First, extreme social inequalities, 
persistently high poverty rates and regular economic crises are seen as indicating that Latin 
democracy lacks the necessary socio-economic basis (Karl 2000).
2 
This perspective generally 
emphasizes the contradictory nature of socio-economically exclusive ‘formal democracies’. 
Second, far-reaching deficiencies regarding the rule of law and the separation of powers — as 
well as the structural weaknesses of party systems and political institutions in general — 
seriously undermine the quality of democracy and thus its legitimacy and efficiency (Carreras 
1998). Latin American democracies are, thirdly, characterized by important authoritarian legacies 
(seen not only in institutional leftovers but as being more generally rooted in a regime-type 
independent ‘political culture’), a feature that is applied to explain the formerly mentioned 
problems as well as the ubiquity of corrupt and clientelistic practices (Philip 2003). Hence the 
fear that Latin America’s political ‘pendulum’ might start to swing back to the authoritarian side. 
Last but not least, it is fourthly argued that the external indebtedness of Latin America combined 
with globalization and the economic, military and political preponderance of ‘the North’ 
(especially the United States (US)) prevent any democratic self-determination (Robinson 2000; 
Plattner 2002).
3 
The critique of real-existing democracy (not only) in Latin America remains empirically well-
founded and normatively important. However, with the increasing durability of these all-too 
precarious democracies the analytical perspective now clearly needs readjustment. Already with 
regard to the ‘lost decade’, Karen Remmer (1990: 335) emphasized that ‘The puzzle of the 1980s 
[...] has not been the fragility of democracy, but its surprising vitality in the face of overwhelming 
economic constraints.’ The experience of the recent ‘lost half-decade’ between 1998 and 2002 
only reinforces this argument.
4 
This ‘surprising vitality’ of democracy, in spite of its faulty 
implementation and adverse context, finds its scientific expression in two dominant appraisals 
which appear relatively contradictory. On the one hand, there is the general prognosis that real-
existing democracy in Latin America is not sustainable. The huge social inequalities and poor 
performance of economic and social policies are seriously undermining the legitimacy of 
democratic rule. Thus, without fundamental socio-economic change the ‘democratic civil peace’ 
(Hegre et al. 2001) will not survive in the middle to long run. On the other hand, research into 
Latin America at the beginning of the new century consensually concludes that—although no 
fundamental changes as proposed above are to be expected—the return to openly authoritarian 
patterns of rule is not an available option. Temporary states of emergency, attempted coups and 
even the successful overthrow of elected governments are possible and, indeed, a reality. 
However, the currently dominant assessment is that even a successful post-coup government 
would quickly have to return to the procedural-democratic way. Combined, both appraisals lead 
to the expectation that democratic procedures and norms will be increasingly undermined and 
eroded without the ‘democratic minimum’ being openly called into question (Boeninger 1997: 
44; Agüero 1998; Cameron 2000: 1; Hakim 2000: 12). 
This dual appraisal takes Remmer’s puzzle into account. Yet, it does not contribute to its 
explanation. Attempts at advancing such an explanation by inventing new terms and concepts can 
be regarded as equally failed. This not only refers to the proliferation of ‘democracies with 
adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky 1997), but especially to the concept of consolidation (Becker 
1999; O’Donnell 1999: chapter 9). The latter indeed serves to differentiate ‘between the mere 
persistence of democracy and its ‘‘genuine’’ consolidation’ and thus it becomes possible ‘to state 
that the continuity of democracy is not endangered while at the same time assessing that its 
‘genuine’ consolidation becomes more and more jeopardized’ (Barrios 1999: 15). In this way, 
however, we are only calling the paradox by a new name. It remains completely unclear why 
3 
these ‘non-consolidated democracies’ appear to be ‘self-sustaining’ but not — because they 
would then be consolidated — ‘selfenforcing’ (Philip 2003: 11).
5 
This article tries to capture this problem by taking an integrative perspective of Latin America’s 
‘double transformation’ (Smith et al. 1994a, 1994b; Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998a; Oxhorn 
and Starr 1999a). It comes as no surprise that the results of political liberalization cannot be 
understood without taking into account the neo-liberally guided economic restructuring of society 
and state (Waisman 1999; Garretón 2001). These relations between neo-liberalization and 
democratization have shown to be much more complex than often thought. Political and 
economic liberalization by no means merge into a harmonious ‘all good things go together’. This 
simpleminded view of neo-liberals adopting classical modernization theory can be regarded as 
having been refuted by the Latin American experience of the past 25 years. Yet, democracy 
systematically impedes consequent economic reforms just a little, as suggested by the experience 
with authoritarian developmental states following World War II. The harsh neo-liberal 
programmes implemented by elected and re-elected governments have proven this view wrong 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Powers 1997; Weyland 1998). Finally, the idea that is popular 
among globalization critiques that the socioeconomic consequences of neo-liberal restructuring 
will sooner rather than later lead to the breakdown of democracy equally seems overly 
mechanistic. After all, the ‘surprising vitality’ of Latin American democracy is the starting point 
of this article. 
Contrary to all these clearcut approaches to the double transformation, this article proposes a 
conception of explicitly ambivalent relations between (socio-) political and (socio-) economic 
transformation (Oxhorn and Starr 1999b: 242). By drawing on arguments put forward among 
others by Philip Oxhorn, Carlos Acuña, Carlos Waisman and Marcus Kurtz, this article argues 
that the transformations associated with political and economic (neo-) liberalization have social-
economic consequences that, firstly, are evidently socio-politically destabilizing and that, 
secondly, systematically hollow out democratic participation and representation by undermining 
the potential for collective action on the part of broad sectors of society. Thirdly, however, this 
second implication simultaneously operates in a politically stabilizing manner as it is the 
capability for politically mobilizing precisely those harmed by neo-liberal reforms and economic 
crises which is being limited. Further and fourthly, the sanction and incentive mechanisms of the 
world economy and world policy support exactly this limitation and stabilization of democracy: 
access to external loans and investment requires political stability and economic credibility, 
international cooperative relationships and international legitimacy (at least, in the Western 
hemisphere) require the maintenance of basic proceduraldemocratic standards and economic 
reliability. In the end, it is the de facto exclusion of broad sectors of society which hollows out 
democratic participation and representation while at the same time stabilizing real-existing 
democracy. 
Since this article deals with the ambivalent consequences of social exclusion for real-existing 
democracy, the international dimension — although important — will not be dealt with in an 
explicit way. This does not imply, however, that it is entirely ignored. Yet the main focus is on 
the surprising compatibility of real-existing Latin democracy with a highly exclusive social 
structure, and hence on consequences rather than causes.
6 
This said, it is also clear that the 
present article uses the term democracy in a minimal and relatively ‘unscrupulous’ way, calling 
all those Latin American countries democratic that comply with the basic features of polyarchy 
(Lindblom 1977; Dahl 1989) regardless of their respective deficiencies.
7 
In what follows the 
general argument will be developed. Then it will be demonstrated how the perspective of the 
double transformation can be made useful in explaining the central features of de- as well as re-
stabilization in Argentina between 2000 and 2003. The Argentine example is significant here as 
4 
the country’s socio-economic crisis had extraordinary depth — comparable from a ‘Northern’ 
perspective only to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Yet the escalation of the socio-political 
crisis was short-lived, while the real-existing democracy of Argentina appeared to come through 
the crisis even stronger than before. 
 
An Alternative Perspective on Democracy and Peace in Latin America 
Marcus Kurtz (2004: 264) summarizes the results of Latin America’s double transformation in 
two general observations. On the one hand, neo-liberal reforms have ‘become popularly 
associated with persistent material hardships (for example, unemployment, declining real wages, 
rising informality)’, ‘involved direct assaults by the state on powerful vested interests’, ‘been 
followed by markedly increased levels of poverty and inequality’, and ‘often required the 
abandonment of long-cherished political commitments to nationalist goals.’ On the other hand, 
‘despite these hardships, political activity, protest, mobilization, and even individual voter 
participation in new or rebuilt democratic polities has been surprisingly anemic, and have 
nowhere provoked the sorts of elite responses that destroyed democracy in the past.’ This 
combination not only appears paradoxical for conventional perspectives on the relation between 
democracy and economic reform (Przeworski 1991; Remmer 1995).
8 
It proves equally puzzling 
for general explanations of political violence since both of the main approaches — economic 
discontent theories a` la Ted Robert Gurr (1970) as well as political opportunity theories a` la 
Charles Tilly (1978) — would expect an escalation of violent political conflict following the 
combination of socio-economic deprivation and political liberalization. 
After the deep financial crises that characterized the recent ‘lost half decade’, the puzzle can be 
restated as follows: why do Latin American democracies — having on one hand serious flaws 
regarding the inputdimension of political legitimacy
9 
while, on the other hand displaying features 
of social inequality and exclusion which undermine democratic outputlegitimacy
10 
— survive 
even harsh economic crises which bring all these deficiencies to the fore? As the recent 
experiences of Argentina (2001/ 2002), Ecuador (2000), and Bolivia (2003) show, deep socio-
political crises do indeed materialize. However, escalations seem (so far) to remain within the 
realm of ‘regime-level crises’ (Levitsky 2001).
11 
To understand these processes it is necessary to 
incorporate an explanatory variable which is neglected in much of the research on Latin 
democracy and its crises: the degree of politicization, understood as social mobilization and 
organization aiming at collective political articulation and participation. It is thus the argument to 
be outlined, the existence of systematic and selective constraints on politicization that helps 
understand the durability of precarious democracy in Latin America. Latin democracies’ 
structures of exclusion, while certainly harming both input- and output-legitimacy, do in some 
way compensate for these losses precisely as exclusion goes hand in hand with a reduced 
capability to act collectively. 
 
Latin America’s double transformation and the limits to popular collective action 
Between the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, most countries of Latin America went through a 
series of economic crises, authoritarian rule and neo-liberal restructuring. Regardless of the 
specific timing and degree involved, this implied processes of fundamental social change 
(Garretón 2001). The end of import-substituting industrialization (ISI) with its focus on the 
domestic market and the strong developmental state along with the adoption of the neoliberal, 
(world) market-oriented development model severely weakened the bearers of the ISI regime: 
organized labour, domestic-market-oriented business, employees of the public sector (Waisman 
1999: 45; Garretón 2001: 244). The debt crisis that forced this transition through hit those groups 
already excluded in the ‘state corporatist’ model of selective and ‘controlled inclusion’ (Oxhorn 
5 
1995, 1998b): the poor and the informal sector. The repression, especially of ‘the Left’, but also 
generally of (party) political activists pursued by the military dictatorships of the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s contributed to this structural dismantling of the capacity for autonomous societal 
organization and interest articulation (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998b: 9–10). The neo-liberal 
responses to economic crises intensified these tendencies (Acuña 1994; Hagopian 1998: 107). 
Generally stated, economic crisis and neo-liberal reform eroded the social and political status of 
the popular sectors (Roberts 2002: 5; Portes and Hoffman 2003).
12 
Rising un- and under-
employment, the precarization and informalization of labour, the reduction of public sector 
employment, and the partially traumatic experiences with hyperinflation seriously weakened 
organized labour (Hagopian 1998: 109; Oxhorn 1998b: 204).
13 
At the same time, the rise of 
informal and poor sectors did not translate into increasing collective resistance on the part of 
those affected by impoverishment and deprivation because of the ‘sheer demoralization that 
usually follows downward mobility’ as well as because ‘people in this situation are likely to 
weaken or cut ties among themselves and with their class of origin’ (Waisman 1999: 47; cf. 
Kurtz 2004: 265; O’Donnell 1999: 207). The general insecurity associated with economic crisis 
and neo-liberal reform leads people to focus ‘their energy and attention on survival and on the 
search for individual exit options’ (Waisman 1999: 47). Likewise, existing (and newly evolving) 
modes of societal organization centre on local solidarity and self-help, remaining largely 
apolitical and poorly institutionalized (Oxhorn 1998b: 208, note 22). Yet, disintegration, 
fragmentation and differentiation affected the middle classes as well, as Guillermo O’Donnell 
(1999: 206) emphasized: 
Considerable decreases in pensions and in the salaries of public employees, particularly the lower ranking 
ones, unemployment resulting from privatizations and various ‘rationalization’ programs, high rates of 
bankruptcy of small enterprises during economic crises and at least during the first phases of economic 
stabilization, and the deterioration (or disappearance) of various social services to which these sectors had 
good access have combined to bring about a sharp fall of the income and the standard of living of significant 
numbers of people in the middle sectors. On the other hand, various indications suggest that some layers, 
especially those composed by individuals who cater to the rich — highly educated professionals and owners 
of firms dedicated to luxury goods and services — have notably improved their situation throughout these 
years. It seems, consequently, that ‘the middle’ has significantly differentiated itself, with some moving 
toward the poor and some toward the rich poles [...]. 
The introduction of democracy, or at least the possibility to vote, constituted the main resource of 
input-legitimacy and by this way demobilized large parts of ‘civil society’ that had organized 
against authoritarian regimes (Oxhorn 1998b: 208). However, as economic crises and neo-liberal 
reforms paralleled democratization output-legitimacy became crucial. Initially, the harsh neo-
liberal programmes gained support by succeeding in the fight against (hyper-) inflation (Weyland 
1998). When economies had stabilized and, at the latest when neoliberally restructured 
economies themselves got into a crisis, ‘compensatory targeted social policies’ became the 
central mechanisms for increasing legitimacy (Bresser Pereira and Nakano 1998: 32–35). 
Although the new rhetoric of poverty reduction has increasingly adopted the objectives of 
participation and empowerment of the poor (Spanger and Wolff 2003), the execution of targeted 
and selective anti-poverty programmes regularly has converse effects. Because these policies 
typically focus on the individual poor and emphasize his participation in the market, they tend to 
strengthen the clientelistic linkages between individualized poor and political institutions (or, 
more precisely, local patrons) and reinforce declining mobilization capabilities and political 
apathy (Bresser Pereira and Nakano 1998: 33). ‘The result is a muting of social pressures for 
change — and relative political stability’ (Oxhorn 1998b: 216). Last but not least, the limits to 
popular mobilization and politicization have an important cognitive–ideological dimension with 
exogenous as well as domestic origins: 
6 
The exogenous sources are international demonstration effects: economic nationalists and leftists have been 
affected by the collapse of communism and by the apparent success of the Thatcher-Reagan economic 
policies in the 1970s and 1980s. The endogenous factor is the process of political learning experienced by 
state, political, economic and cultural elites which was triggered by the economic and political consequences 
of the ‘old regime’. [...] Everywhere in the world, the cumulative effect of these cognitive processes has been 
both the abandonment of autarkic capitalism and acceptance of the liberal model (Waisman 1999: 48–49). 
The convergence around the neo-liberal model is only partially based on active support, while 
more important is the ‘ideological paralysis caused by the exhaustion of alternatives’ (Waisman 
1999: 49), especially on the part of the (former) political ‘Left’ (Oxhorn 1998b: 216, note 32).
14 
This absence of political alternatives is further strengthened by the explicitly technocratic and 
apolitical bias of neo-liberal discourse (Oxhorn 1998b: 201; Nolte 2002: 162). This de-
politicization, in particular of economic policy, joins the trend to de-ideologize and de-polarize 
political debates and, thus, severely restricts the translation of the widespread discontent into 
collective political action.
15 
Thus, while socio-economic transformations reduce politicization 
mainly by reducing the capacity of popular sectors to organize politically and act collectively, the 
neo-liberally guided transformation of the state and political discourse complements this trend by 
reducing the incentives and referents to engage in collective political action Garretón 2001: 244). 
 
Constraints on political mobilization, democracy and stability 
The constraints on collective action described above do not apply to ‘civil society’ in general. 
They do not, as Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (1998a, 1998b) inferred, indiscriminately limit civil-
societal activity. The ‘underarticulation of societal interests’, the ‘pervasive social atomization’, 
and the ‘political quiescence founded in collective action problems,’ which Marcus Kurtz (2004: 
263) identifies, operate asymmetrically and unevenly. The existence of multifaceted and vital 
societal associations — ‘in some areas of social life (both vertically and horizontally, among the 
class segments and regions that are the ‘winners’ in the process of economic differentiation)’ 
(Waisman 1999: 52) — is thus completely compatible with the above argument. Yet, these civil 
society groups (ideal-typically) come from certain ‘upper’ and, mostly, urban sectors of society, 
are primarily locally-based, are less the result of social mobilization than taking the form of small 
and well-organized NGOs, and focus on a specific single issue rather than aiming at representing 
a certain group’s or alliance’s broader political interests.  
The effect of this asymmetrical constraint on political mobilization is the ‘segmentation of 
society into an organized and autonomous sector that looks very much like a strong civil society 
and a disorganized or dependent sector susceptible to political marginality or subordination to the 
state’ (Waisman 1999: 55), with this constellation being the direct result of the double 
transformation that materializes in parallel processes of political democratization and economic 
differentiation reinforcing social heterogeneity (Oxhorn 1998b: 196). Now, the consequences for 
democracy and social peace are quite ambivalent. 
Evidently, constraints on political mobilization limit the chances of the (active) articulation and 
participation of those broad sectors of society affected. The extent of (passive) representation, 
however, also becomes distorted: in pluralist democracy, those societal interests and values that 
are not adequately mobilized, organized and articulated generally remain underrepresented. The 
basis for making democracy relatively representative in capitalist societies is the capacity to 
compensate for economic and social power disparities by using numbers (i.e. numerical strong 
interests) as a political resource (Oxhorn 1998b: 209). Generally, the responsiveness of the 
political system, that is, the translation of societal inputs into political outputs, relies on the — 
mostly collective — articulation of social demands (Lindblom 1977). Thus, uneven 
depoliticization and disorganization tend to undermine ‘the representativeness, accountability, 
7 
and thus potentially the very legitimacy of democratic institutions and politicians’ (Kurtz 2004: 
265). 
Accordingly, the different facets of social exclusion lead to the situation that Latin American 
‘Democracy Isn’t All That Democratic’ (Oxhorn 2001), a scenario that Carlos Acuña and 
William Smith — emphasizing the asymmetric nature of exclusion and integration — have 
labelled ‘dual democracies’.
16 
As democracy is based on a ‘logic of mobilization’ (Waisman 
1999), the systematic and asymmetrical constraint on social capacities for collective action 
seriously restricts democracy (Strasser 2000). Hence the ‘apparent contradiction between 
advances in (modest forms of) formal democracy and mounting obstacles in deepening 
democracy towards more participation and dealing with socioeconomic inequality’ (Huber et al. 
1997: 337–38): the democratic element in the sense of fair participation and representation is 
hollowed out while basic democratic norms and procedures are generally maintained (or even 
strengthened).
17 
The Latin American ‘neo-populism’ can be interpreted as a consequence of, as well as a 
contribution to, this hollowing-out of democracy as it combines traditional populist elements 
(personalization of political rule, reliance on patronage, anti-establishment orientation) with the 
new circumstances (atomized, frustrated society, anti-political orientation, neo-liberal hegemony, 
economic outward-orientation):
18 
The political space left empty by weak popular organizations and the failure of political parties to establish 
organizational ties to subordinate classes has been filled by clientelistic networks. These networks link lower 
class individuals and informal social groups to individual politicians; they serve at best as transmitters of 
temporary particularistic favors, not as channels to mobilize citizens into influencing policy formation (Huber 
et al. 1997: 334). 
The analysis of neo-populism thus points to the ambivalent consequences we are concerned with: 
the same transformations that, on one hand hollow out democratic processes, on the other hand 
serve to stabilize the respective polities (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998c: 238; Nolte 2002: 165). 
For the constraints on political mobilization developed above while limiting institutionalized 
participation and representation of those societal interests and values affected, at the same time, 
inhibit the latter’s collective extra- and anti-institutional manifestation (Oxhorn 1998b: 207). The 
result is O’Donnell’s ‘angry atomization of society’ (O’Donnell 1999: chapter 7), a situation that 
becomes manifest in the regular Latinobarómetro surveys of individuals’ discontent (Lagos 
2001), ‘punctuated by quite infrequent, highly inorganic (though not usually spontaneous), and 
very short-lived outbursts of activity, sometimes violent’ (Waisman 1999: 47). However, as 
Adam Przeworski (1991: 28) argued, 
[...] forms of individual noncompliance can threaten democracy when they are on a mass scale, by creating a 
potential for sporadic street outbursts or ephemeral antidemocratic movements. But isolated individuals do 
not shake social orders. This is why ‘legitimacy’ understood in individual terms [...] has little bearing on the 
issue of regime stability. Only organized political forces have the capacity to undermine the democratic 
system. 
This is precisely what can be observed during the processes of de- and restabilization marking the 
Argentine crisis of 2001/2002. 
 
The Example of the Argentine Crisis 
At first sight, the Argentine crisis followed the theoretical expectations: with the socio-economic 
situation deteriorating socio-political protests spread throughout the country (Giarraca 2002; 
Seoane 2002).
19 
It was precisely at the apex of the economic crisis in December 2001/January 
2002 that social protests exploded (estallido social) leading to the ousting of President Fernando 
de la Rúa and three of his successors. However, the surprisingly quick sociopolitical re-
stabilization in 2002/2003 — while socio-economic indicators only slowly recuperated — points 
8 
to the fact that societal relations are much more complex than the simple correlation would 
suggest. 
 
From destabilization to open crisis 
After the mid-1990s a new social actor entered the political arena: the movement of the 
piqueteros, organizations of unemployed which won growing attention by blocking highways 
(piquetes) throughout the country.
20 
Following the neo-liberal reforms of President Carlos 
Menem (privatization, deregulation, opening-up of the economy) and the ‘side-effects’ of the 
dollar peg under the currency board system (de-industrialization, recession, deflation) 
unemployment reached historic heights (Pastor and Wise 1999, 2001). Indicators of poverty and 
social inequality equally deteriorated heavily in the second half of the 1990s (CEB 2002). The 
protests directly correlated to this socio-economic deprivation. Following the first blockades in 
1996, the number of piquetes quickly expanded to one every one-and-a-half days in 1999 and 
daily blockades in 2000, reaching four to five piquetes per day in 2001 (Filippini 2002: 5). Thus, 
organized unemployed became a primary, albeit in no way unitary, actor shaping the Argentine 
landscape of protest. 
The flipside of the rise of the piqueteros was the mass weakening of trade unions. The ‘neo-
liberalization’ of the Peronist party (Partido Justicialista) under Menem (Gutiérrez 1998; 
Levitsky 1999) hit organized labour from two sides. On the one hand, with the rise of 
unemployment, informal and precarious work unions’ bases — which had already declined 
during the economic crisis of the 1980s — shrank further (Palomino 1995). On the other hand, 
the contentious attitude of organized labour towards the Menem government led to the division 
into three competing labour confederations (Armelino 2003): The Argentine labour movement 
and the Peronist party were traditionally deeply interwoven and, thus, many unions maintained 
loyalty to the government in spite of the Peronist’s programmatic change. It was not until the 
Peronist party went into opposition after De la Rúa’s election as President in 1999 that the labour 
confederations were increasingly able to at least unite their markedly diminished forces.
21 
In 2000 
and 2001, nationwide general strikes against diverse austerity packages accumulated — a trend 
on its part indicating the intensification of protest. 
However, in the end it was neither unions nor piqueteros that shaped the events of December 
2001.
22 
In fact, one can fairly say that the unorganized population per se, united in rejecting the 
status quo, led the ‘social explosion’.
23 
Ten years of neo-liberal reforms and 3 years of recession 
had laid the foundations for ubiquitous social hostility against the entire political elite, as 
symbolized in the claim that ‘they all must go’ (‘Que se vayan todos!’). During the 1990s seven 
million Argentines — a fifth of the entire population — descended from the middle class to 
poverty (Kliksberg 2002, 2003), adding to the persistent (and itself growing) spectrum of the 
traditional poor. During the first two years of the new century the rise of poverty and indigence 
accelerated to (in Argentina) unknown levels.
24 
The parliamentary elections in October 2001 sent 
the first wake-up call signalling the general discontent: some four million Argentines (roughly a 
quarter of the electorate) cast the so-called ‘vote of anger’ (voto bronca), that is, blank or void 
votes, adding to the 26 percent that did not even go to vote. 
In December 2001 discontent exploded. To stop a bank run and a capital flight, on 1 December 
the De la Rúa government implemented the corralito (play pen), a partial freeze on deposits. With 
bank withdrawals severely limited the remaining formal economic activities became paralyzed. 
The situation turned intolerable especially for small savers, retail traders and the urban middle 
strata in general. Simultaneously, the government budget bill for 2002 envisioned further 
austerity measures and thus led the labour confederation to jointly declare a general strike. In 
mid-December social unrest spread from the suburbs to Buenos Aires and increasingly escalated 
9 
to violence. Two phenomena characterized the landscape of protest: lootings of supermarkets 
(saqueos) resulting from heterogeneous and spontaneous alliances of stranded popular sectors, 
and the cacerolazos, pot-banging protests led by the (former) urban middle classes. The political 
response — repression on the part of the executive, passivity on the part of the parties — only 
aggravated the situation (Filippini 2002). On 19 and 20 December, insurgency peaked with 
confrontations between police and protesters leading to 30d eaths and hundreds of injuries. The 
declaration of a state of siege was only responded to by a renewed cacerolazo. In the end, not 
only President De la Rúa and his cabinet had to resign but three Peronist successors similarly 
backed down in the face of the social protest. Only Eduardo Duhalde, the fourth interim-president 
within 10day s, could stay in office. 
Backed by all the major parties in a ‘government of national unity’, Duhalde eliminated the 
peso/dollar parity, confirmed Argentina’s international insolvency and declared an end to the 
economic model that, as he emphasized, had only served to bring desperation to the large 
majority of the population. However, the social unrest continued. Again it was the popular 
sectors that lost purchasing power with the peso devaluing by more than 70pe r cent and inflation 
rising. Meanwhile, deposits remained frozen. Thus, widespread protests against the corralito 
persisted as did confrontations between piqueteros and the police (Fiszbein et al. 2002: 10). 
Further, new modes of societal selforganization at the local level spread throughout the country 
(Battistini 2002; Colectivo Situaciones 2002; Dinerstein 2002). Following the protest experiences 
of ‘19/20’ (of December 2001), popular assemblies (asambleas populares) evolved as local fora 
for public debate and interest articulation independent of any state, party or union structure 
(Bielsa et al. 2002; Abal Medina et al. 2002). Material needs were increasingly satisfied via a 
parallel economy consisting of thousands of clubes de trueque, local barter clubs based on non-
official barter monies (créditos). In addition, with the bankruptcy of enterprises spreading, more 
and more employees took over factories abandoned by insolvent entrepreneurs (fábricas 
recuperadas) (Heller 2004). In the meantime, however, unemployment, poverty and social 
inequality reached ever-growing heights. 
 
From re-stabilization to the ‘K-effect’ 
In the course of 2002 the protests gradually cooled down. According to official data, the number 
of protests fell from well above 2,000 per month in the first trimester of 2002 to less than 1,000 
protests after June 2002, oscillating around 600 in 2003 and 500 in 2004 (Mecon 2004). Whereas 
the interim presidency of Duhalde was accompanied by declining, yet still recurrently escalating 
protests, it was when Néstor Kirchner assumed the presidency in May 2003 that realexisting 
democracy in Argentina proved not only to have survived but to have even strengthened through 
the crisis (Schamis 2002; Gabetta 2003; Peruzzotti 2004). At the risk of oversimplifying the 
complex processes involved, this surprisingly quick re-stabilization can be traced back along 
three lines of analysis: the limited recovery of output-legitimacy, the gradual rehabilitation of 
input-legitimacy, and the ‘nature’ of the social protests itself.
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The output dimension of handling the Argentine crisis 
With debt payments ceased (save those to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank), international competitiveness recuperated after the devaluation of the peso, and the 
corralito gradually lifted, the Argentine economy slowly picked up. Duhalde on his part reacted 
quickly to alleviate the worst effects of the crisis. Social emergency programmes stopped the 
looting, the most important being the monthly payment of about 50dollars destined for some two 
million unemployed households under the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar started in April 2002. Yet 
these social programmes had more than just direct material effects. By employing the existing 
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Peronist patronage networks (Levitsky 2003) for distributing the monies, the former links 
between the popular sectors and the Peronist-dominated political system were reestablished. By 
letting local piquetero organizations execute employment programmes some of the leading 
protest groups could also be re-integrated politically (Svampa and Pereyra 2004). 
Meanwhile, the privatized public services’ tariffs were frozen in spite of devaluation and inflation 
(Azpiazu and Schorr 2003). Thus, surging tariffs for electricity, gas or water — common sources 
of social unrest during financial crises — were prevented. With regard to the middle strata and 
domesticmarket- oriented business, the gradual lifting of the deposit freeze combined with 
asymmetric ‘pesification’ circumvented the definite ruin of indebted enterprises and citizens. 
While dollar-denominated debts were converted oneto- one into peso, deposits received 1.40pe so 
per dollar. Although the latter was quite a low rate, with the peso down to 3 peso per dollar, the 
one-to-one conversion of debts meant an all the more important debt relief (Fritz and Llanos 
2002).
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When looking at the social indicators, however, this recuperation of outputlegitimacy 
can only be regarded as relatively limited (Katz 2003).
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In this way, input-legitimacy becomes 
important. 
 
The input dimension of handling the Argentine crisis 
Tentatively under Duhalde and explicitly with Kirchner, the government opened up to the most 
important protest groups. The government regularly conducted dialogue with the organizations of 
the piqueteros, representatives of the labour confederations and human rights groups like the 
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. It responded to the protests by adjusting its rhetoric (e.g. against 
neoliberalism, against IMF imposition) and by adopting concrete demands (e.g. regarding social 
emergency programmes). This strategy of dialogue and concessions aimed at the re-integration of 
the middle classes and generally the ‘moderate’ protest groups by creating possibilities for the 
‘civilized’ handling of conflict while at the same time trying to marginalize the ‘radical’ factions. 
The partly clearly brutal repression seen under Duhalde of certain protest groups, criminalized as 
‘violence actors’, has to be seen as the downside of the general opening-up strategy. 
Duhalde’s turn to elections proved to be an important step in rehabilitating the input-legitimacy 
of the Argentine polity. Himself only legitimized as interim-president elected by congress, in July 
2002 Duhalde reacted to newly escalating protests by announcing the bringing forward of 
presidential elections to spring 2003. With these forthcoming elections, the socio-political 
debates shifted from societal fora of negotiation and protest towards political institutions. An 
initially broad-based protest alliance demanding the dissolution of parliament, government and 
Supreme Court in favour of a constituent assembly eventually dissolved when important 
representatives of leftist parties instead decided to run for presidency. With the two traditional 
parties (Radicals and Peronists) each presenting two and three candidates, respectively, the 
electorate had quite a choice. Since former president Carlos Menem himself competed while 
other candidates like the Peronist Kirchner or the centre-left alternative Elisa Carriópresented 
themselves as openly anti- Menemist, by voting Argentines finally got the chance to reject the 
‘Argentine model’ of the 1990s (as symbolized by Menem). Indeed, the aim to prevent the return 
of Menem drove large majorities of the (former) protest groups to cast ‘useful votes’ (voto útil, 
i.e. valid votes against Menem). Had Menem not capitulated Kirchner would have won the 
second ballot with some 70–80 percent as forecast by unambiguous polls. 
Néstor Kirchner — who after all succeeded as Duhalde’s candidate, too — largely continued 
with his predecessor’s approach of macro-economic and social–political stabilization. A 
discourse that centred on the notion of ‘Argentine interests first’ (instead of the foreign interests 
of the IMF, the US, or private creditors), on domestic markets and a supposedly ‘strong’ and 
development-oriented state followed the protestors’ demands of changing the ‘model’ of the 
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1990s (Godio 2004). Yet Kirchner’s strategy of ‘de- Menemizing’ the country went beyond 
economic issues by focusing explicitly on the attempt to re-establish citizens’ confidence in 
political institutions. For this purpose, he immediately began to tackle some of the deficiencies of 
Argentine democracy most denounced by the social protests: political corruption, for example, in 
the police of Buenos Aires, malfunctions of the division of powers, for example, the 
politicization of the Supreme Court, and the rule of law, for example, the problem of impunity 
(Sabanes Plou 2003a, 2003b). Last but not least, Kirchner largely retreated from Duhalde’s 
strategy of repressing ‘radical’ protest groups (especially piqueteros) in favour of generally 
accepting protest as a legitimate way to articulate social interests and needs. 
It is this specific combination of output- and input-oriented efforts to augment legitimacy which 
explains the so-called ‘K-effect’ (Natanson 2004) — the phenomenon whereby only a few 
months after a large majority of Argentines had rejected the whole political system, following the 
2003 elections opinion polls continuously found some 80per cent of support for the new 
President Kirchner. At the same time, the general satisfaction of the population with the way 
democracy works recuperated from its all-time low of 8 per cent seen in 2002 to 34 per cent in 
2003.
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Yet we have to be cautious not to overstate the extent to which the broad sectors of 
society which found themselves on the streets in December 2001 have in fact (re-)gained 
possibilities of influencing policy-making and actually benefited (socio-economically) from the 
‘new’ direction of economic policy. As already noted, poverty, social inequality, unemployment 
and, thus, social exclusion in general, have remained on fairly high levels and (up to now) the 
changes in political rhetoric have only marginally found their way into actual policy changes.
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When contrasting these realities — which, at least, are only slowly improving — with the 
astonishingly quick process of socio-political re-stabilization, it becomes clear that the 
explanation given so far remains insufficient (Katz 2003). This explanatory gap can be filled in 
by looking at the ‘nature’ of the protests themselves and at the social structures shaping them. By 
doing this, I will now apply the general argument developed in the first part of the article to the 
Argentine case.  
 
The ‘nature’ of the protests 
The notion of a generalized societal insurgency against the Argentine political and economic 
system applies, at the utmost, to the few days near Christmas 2001 (Jozami 2003). Beyond that, 
organization among and across protest groups was generally weak and primary local. 
Correspondingly, mobilization remained sporadic and unstable. A programmatic platform under 
which relevant parts of protesting society could have united was completely absent. Thus, the 
potential for broader societal alliances reaching beyond the rejection of the status quo never 
materialized. 
The looting seen was driven by concrete desperation and opportunity. Even if at least in parts it 
was provoked by local Peronist party brokers, these ad hoc actions can be regarded as diffuse, 
heterogeneous and unorganized (Auyero and Moran 2004). Hence, it was easy to stop them by 
reducing both desperation (via limited social emergency programmes) and opportunity (by 
restoring the government’s monopoly of force). Yet, the cacerolazos are not so different. This 
type of pot-banging demonstration succeeded in overcoming the obstacles imposed upon social 
mobilization by the neo-liberal restructured society (Buchanan 1997). The consumption-oriented 
member of the middle class, the non-unionized service (or informal) sector employee, the 
atomized ‘new poor’ — they all could individually follow the sound of the banging pots into the 
streets to join the protests. However, the capacity to act collectively was largely limited to the 
demonstration against the status quo. With a sufficient number of representatives being replaced, 
the single call for ‘Que se vayan todos’ had to reach an impasse. With the government opening 
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up discussion about the concrete handling of the crisis, the divergent interests and largely non-
existent concepts on the part of the protest groups were to come to the fore. 
At the local level organization succeeded much better. Yet the ‘social innovations’ mentioned 
above (popular assemblies, barter clubs, recuperated factories) did not pose a serious threat to the 
political system. Quite the contrary: precisely as they provided channels to articulate discontent, 
fora to organize local solidarity and concrete achievements to alleviate basic needs, they 
(unintentionally) became part of the process of re-stabilization. As open political and economic 
crisis was the prime feature uniting internally diverse local communities, in the course of 2002 
these social innovations quickly lost momentum. In contrast to popular assemblies or barter 
clubs, the organizations of unemployed proved to be much more sustainable (Svampa and 
Pereyra 2004). However, with the government opening up to their demands the ample piquetero 
movement divided quickly into ‘co-operationists’ (meanwhile openly ‘Kirchnerists’) and 
‘confrontationists’, the latter again being split into organizations led by small parties of the 
traditional radical left and an alliance of autonomous groups. Although national umbrella 
organizations had emerged, the piqueteros remained primarily local. Correspondingly, their 
(diverse) political aspirations notwithstanding, the prime interest remained the call for state-
funded social assistance and employment programmes on one hand, along with concrete, 
territorial, and in many instances remarkable community work on the other. In this way, the 
piquetero movement became increasingly politically ‘manageable’. Further, with government 
repression and thus, societal solidarity effects declining, the continuing blockades and protests of 
the more confrontationist piqueteros soon appeared to be relatively isolated from public (and, 
particularly, published) opinion. 
Generally, the protests proved to be fragmented and heterogeneous, were widely unorganized 
(saqueos, cacerolazos) or primary locally based (piqueteros, asambleas), and were able to ally 
themselves only in the global rejection of the status quo and in some concrete demands for 
governmental assistance. From the perspective presented in the first part of this article, the up- 
and down-turn of the Argentine protest wave can thus be traced back to the (not merely) 
socioeconomic transformations of the 1980s and 1990s, to the profound changes in the sphere of 
labour relations with un-, under-, informal and precarious employment rising, to the strong 
differentiation within the once strong Argentine middle sectors and the once powerful labour 
movement as exemplified by the rise of ‘new poor’ and an increasingly heterogeneous service 
sector. With capacity and opportunity for collective action changing, potential protesters adapted 
their strategies: saqueos, cacerolazos and piquetes instead of general strikes, local neighbourhood 
assemblies instead of partybased mass mobilizations, unstable and crisis-driven collective 
outrage instead of long-term organization. Accordingly, socio-political tranquilization was not 
the simple result of a once again satisfied population but also has to be seen as an acceptance of 
the limits of the collective action that was then possible. Indeed, representatives of those formerly 
quite confrontationist piquetero organizations that in the meantime support President Kirchner 
openly express this ‘learning effect’.
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Hence the observation that ‘apathy and indifference were 
the outstanding features of citizens’ attitudes previous to the elections’ in April 2003, while ‘the 
alleged political mobilization of the Argentine population was hardly noticeable’ (Blomeier 
2003: 5). 
It was only against this background that the political calming down of an apparently insurgent 
society described above did work. The ‘front of protests’ consisting of ‘old’ and ‘new’ poor, un-, 
under-, and informally employed, small savers, retail traders, and local entrepreneurs could 
quickly be dissolved and reintegrated. This heterogeneity of the protests is reflected in the central 
claims: the uniting ‘Que se vayan todos’ on one hand, with the particularizing material demands 
(social programmes, devolution of deposits) on the other hand. These claims ultimately combined 
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within a relatively apolitical stance. The critical power of the protests was mainly negative or 
‘destituent’ (Colectivo Situaciones 2002; Dinerstein 2002) and its positive, constituent elements 
—the new societal and political forms at the local level — stood in stark contrast to the 
macropolitical needs that the economic and social crisis constituted (and which the material 
claims themselves clearly expressed). Thus, by combining the replacement of representatives 
with certain material responses (social programmes, gradual lifting of the corralito, asymmetric 
pesification), the ‘powerful meaning [...] as a radical critique’ (Dinerstein 2002: 8) of the call that 
they all might go could be neutralized relatively easily. Further, the lack of any far-reaching 
political alternative enabled the Peronist governments to adopt many of the protests’ ‘contras’ 
(contra Menemism, contra US and IMF impositions, contra the private creditors, etc.) without 
colliding excessively with the national and international establishment.
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As a result, society — 
with the notable exception of some ‘radical’ and increasingly isolated protest segments — 




The quick re-stabilization following the Argentine crisis demonstrates how an exclusionary social 
structure can combine with political polyarchy in a specific way that leads to an apparently 
precarious, yet astonishing stable constellation. This stability was suggested to be grounded in the 
ambivalent consequences of social exclusion: that interests and values of broad sectors of society 
are only underproportionally included and realized in democratic politics corresponds with their 
capacity for organization, mobilization and collective action being systematically limited. If the 
notion of the ‘democratic civil peace’ (Hegre et al. 2001) refers to the supposed capacity of 
liberal democracy to guarantee social peace by providing all societal interests with fair access to 
and just benefit from political decisions (Przeworski 1991), this configuration can perhaps best be 
called a ‘democratic civil peace of low intensity’.
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This ‘democratic civil peace of low intensity’ is indeed based on a certain — yet historically, 
regionally, and nationally specific — minimum set of democratic procedures and performances. 
At the same time, however, the systematic limitation of democracy in the era of neo-liberal 
globalization constitutes a central pillar of stability. This limitation appears in the relatively 
narrow spectrum of ‘possible’ (economic) policies and in the relatively low capacity for 
collective action on the part of broad sectors of society. As a consequence, the possibility to 
effectuate social inputs as well as to benefit from political outputs remains clearly circumscribed 
for important parts of society. Hence, it is real-existing Latin democracy with its potential for 
integration as well as with its systematic limitations — this combination being the result of the 
double transformation of democratization and neo-liberalization that most Latin American 
countries have passed through — that secures domestic peace and stability. What this article has 
largely left aside is how the international context supports precisely this configuration by 
stabilizing and limiting peripheral democracy.
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If this diagnosis holds, the most probable outlook for the majority of Latin American 
democracies would be a reproduction of such a ‘democratic civil peace of low intensity’. Yet, as 
the experience of Argentina also demonstrates this reproduction of an ‘only in its basics’ stable 
regime on the one hand can go hand in hand with continuing social protest with the (at least 
latent) potential of escalation in the wake of ‘external shocks’ (like economic crises). On the 
other hand and in interaction with the ongoing protests, reproduction implies certain 
transformations as well. In Argentina, the extent of social, economic and political exclusion that 
has been the result of the ‘model’ of the 1990s has clearly been proven unsustainable. 
Correspondingly, as we have seen, the political adaptation to the deep sociopolitical crisis 
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involved some ‘loosening’ of the constraints restricting Argentine democracy. At the same time, 
however, re-stabilization did not involve any significant redistribution of power and wealth but 
was based on the division, co-optation and marginalization, disarticulation and demobilization of 
collective actors who — at the height of the crisis — jointly rejected a real-existing democracy 
that has proven to be far from realizing the most fundamental democratic principles 
(representation, participation, equality). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Argentina’s post-crisis 
politics as compared to its reality in the 1990s are characterized by an important trend of (re-) 
politicization in its different dimensions: at the discourse level, the ‘K-effect’ is based on the 
assertion that economic and social development as subsumed under the proposed change of the 
‘model’ is a genuinely political task; this discourse is complemented at the level of political 
practice by the strategy of ‘opening up’ to social organizations and their demands; and as regards 
social practices, the remaining level of popular sector organization and (potential) mobilization 
(if reduced compared to the crisis years) demands and obtains certain political consideration of 
their (diverse) interests and values. 
In the end, the notion of genuinely ambivalent relations between social exclusion and democracy 
points to an equally ambivalent role of protest and open social conflict in the real-existing 
democracies of Latin America. On the one hand, the recent trend of organization, mobilization 
and politicization among popular sectors — as exemplified by the piquetero movement in 
Argentina or the indigenous movements in countries like Bolivia and Ecuador (Wolff 2003a, 
2004a, 2004b) — constitutes a countertrend to the processes of disorganization, demobilization 
and depoliticization described above. Thus, tendencies to reduce the de facto exclusion of broad 
sectors of Latin American societies — precisely because they are important steps towards further 
democratization — can risk the viability of real-existing democracy, that is mainly by provoking 
the ‘traditional’ response on the part of an elite-middle class alliance (as exemplified by the 2002 
coup against Chávez in Venezuela). On the other hand, the capacity of these new movements to 
exert a certain degree of political pressure by mobilizing masses and blocking highways has 
resulted in a limited recuperation of the (old) mode of corporatist inclusion that manifests itself 
mainly in non-institutionalized forms (protest, repression, ad hoc negotiations) as it has no 
systematic place in the neo-liberally transformed state. Hence, popular sector organizations have 
been granted at least some sort of veto power — a non-institutionalized influence that partially 
mitigates the limits to popular sector participation in and benefits from ‘official’ democratic 
politics. As long as the ‘nature’ of the protests — as analyzed above with regard to the Argentine 
crisis — guarantees that no vital interests of those with institutional, economic and political, 
power are endangered, protest, conflict and even certain crises can become important 
mechanisms in the reproduction and within-regime transformation of the ‘democratic civil peace 
of low intensity’. 
 
Notes 
1 The first version of this article was presented at the IV European Congress CEISAL (Consejo 
Europeo de Investigaciones Sociales de América Latina) of Latinamericanists, Bratislava, 4–7 
July 2004. The author appreciates the support of the Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung (DSF) 
for research for this article. All translations of German, Spanish and French quotations are the 
author’s own. The author also thanks the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. 
2 This position is supported by quantitative work investigating the variables that explain the 
survival and death of democracies: ‘Economic performance [...] is crucially important for the 
survival of democracy in less-affluent countries’ (Przeworski et al. 1996: 42). 
3 On this question, see, for example, Adam (1998), Svetličič (2000), and Van Apeldoorn (2004). 
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4 Correspondingly, George Philip (2003: 18) asks ‘why these apparently precarious systems of 
democracy have not completely broken down,’ while Scott Mainwaring (1999: 103) points to 
‘the remarkable feature [...] that elected governments have managed to survive despite serious 
difficulties in resolving these other problems.’ Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (1998c: 228) emphasize 
that ‘‘unconsolidated’’ democracies in Latin America [...] have experienced an impressive 
staying power in recent decades.’ 
5 Accordingly, George Philip (2003: 115) forecasts: ‘If it were not an oxymoron, one might 
anticipate the deepening of democratic non-consolidation.’ 
6 Insofar that ‘Transnational processes and globalizing dynamics are ‘‘filtered through’’ 
particular nation-states and regions’ (Robinson 2003: 55), this article primarily refers to the 
filtered results without explicitly discussing this transnational dynamics. As regards the case 
study on Argentina, the latter would indeed be necessary to understand why the political handling 
of the crisis acquired the shape it took whereas the focus on domestic dynamics appears 
legitimate to understand why the crisis management had the socio-political (i.e. domestic) 
consequences (restabilization) it had.  
7 It thus accepts the ‘1990s-style downsizing of the concept of democracy’ (Conaghan 1996: 34) 
as a social fact. Yet, it is not only that — as this article is precisely interested in understanding 
the (socio-) political regimes that contemporarily exist in Latin America (and not in something 
that ought to be constructed) — a notion of democracy adapted to these real-existing ‘things’ 
seems reasonable (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 10; Strasser 2000). Further, I believe that a formal 
definition of democracy reflects what the democratic character of a political system realistically 
downsized is about: an opportunity structure provided by some basic formal rules whose 
substance and results are largely undefined (S?ensen 1993: 89) as in the end ‘democracy is above 
all a matter of power’ (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 5). 
8 As there is an inherent tension between the ‘logic of differentiation’, which characterizes the 
strategies of privatization, de-regulation, and opening-up of economies, and the ‘logic of 
mobilization’ constituting the idea of democracy (Waisman 1999; cf. Oxhorn and Starr 1999a), 
the results of the simultaneous implementation of both logics appears paradoxical (Oxhorn and 
Ducatenzeiler 1998b: 11). This combination is surprising for both traditional poles of 
developmental thinking: for modernization theory a` la Huntington, on one hand, which has been 
emphasizing the importance of an authoritarian enforcement of necessary modernization tasks 
while warning against the risks of early democratization for political stability; Marxistoriented 
(and, by the way, normally no less modernization theoretic) critics of modernization theory, on 
the other hand, would expect the escalation of class-based conflicts given the distributional 
consequences of economic reform and crisis in the context of political liberalization (Roberts 
2002: 7). 
9 Compare only the public opinion surveys of the region-wide Latinobarómetro. Democratic 
deficits regarding the input-legitimacy of democratic rule are attributed to internal (Agüero and 
Stark 1998; Diamond et al. 1999; Merkel 1999; Oxhorn 2001; Philip 2003) as well as external 
factors (Huber et al. 1997: 333; Agüero and Stark 1998; Plattner 2002). 
10 Compare Boeninger (1997: 29), Huber et al. (1997: 337), Veltmeyer et al. (1997: 57, 88), 
Bresser 
Pereira and Nakano (1998), Karl (2000: 153–55) and Nolte (2002). 
11 On Bolivia and Ecuador, compare Wolff (2004b). 
12 ‘[T]he ‘‘popular sectors’’ are the disadvantaged groups in highly segmented, unequal 
societies. [...] In urban areas, the popular sectors include both organized and unorganized workers 
in the formal economy, the unemployed who are seeking employment, people working in the 
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informal economy, and the lumpen proletariat who are largely outside the formal and informal 
economies’ (Oxhorn 1998b: 202-203, note 10). 
13 This social–structural weakening of labour organizations via economic restructuring and crisis 
was accompanied by political reforms aiming at the ‘flexibilization of labour’ and, more 
generally, at dismantling traditional corporatist structures (Oxhorn 1998b: 204). 
14 At the same time, it is this exhaustion of ‘left’ alternatives that reduces the threat perception 
on the part of the (political and economic) elites (Remmer 1990: 335; Krennerich 2003: 7). 
15 On the relation between ‘marketization’ and ‘depoliticization’ compare in greater detail Kurtz 
(2004). 
16 This type of ‘fragmented and exclusionary democracy’ is characterized ‘by executive-centered 
politics, high levels of political and economic exclusion, and ‘‘low intensity’’ citizenship in 
which dominant coalitions include a few of the more organized actors within the popular sectors, 
while disarticulating most majoritarian actors’ (Smith and Acuña 1994: 20; on Argentina 
compare Acuña 1995). 
17 Accordingly, ‘the granting of political rights in many new democracies has been accompanied 
by the increasingly precarious nature of civil rights and growing limits — if not actual reversals 
— of the social rights of citizenship’ (Oxhorn 1998a: 2). Hence, Edward Newman (in Garretón 
and Newman 2001: 7) speaks of an ‘emergence of ‘‘limited’’ democracies, conditioned by a 
neoliberal agenda.’  
18 See Oxhorn (1998b: 217), and Roberts (2002: 19). This view of Latin American neo-populism 
as being ambivalently connected to democratization and neo-liberalization, has been proposed by 
Roberts (1995) and Weyland (1996). 
19 It is impossible to go into the details of the economic crisis here (Pastor and Wise 2001; 
Corrales 2002; Starr 2003; Teunissen and Akkerman 2003; Wolff 2003b). Suffice to say that with 
the spread of financial crises from Asia to Brazil and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 
1998 the Argentine economy, with its currency fixed one-to-one to the US dollar (in as in any 
case unsustainable currency board system), came under intense pressure. Confronted with 3 years 
of recession and deflation, escalating debt payments and a complete loss of (internal and 
external) confidence in its currency the Argentine government had to devalue the Peso in January 
2002, initiating a virtual collapse of the economy in 2002. After years of negative growth rates in 
2002 real GDP plunged more than 10 per cent. 
20On the Argentine movement of unemployed workers or piqueteros, see Burdman (2002), Cross 
et al. (2002), Rauber (2002), Oviedo (2004), and Svampa and Pereyra (2004). 
21 After two legislatures since 1989, in 1999 Menem was constitutionally prohibited from 
running for a new term. With the economy sliding, social indicators worsening and issues like 
corruption and good governance coming to the fore, the ALIANZA, an alliance between De la 
Rúa’s Radical party and the centre-left coalition FREPASO (Frente País Solidario), defeated the 
Peronist candidate Eduardo Duhalde. 
22 On crisis escalation in December 2001, see Altamira (2002), Astarita (2002), Filippini (2002), 
Godio (2002), Sullivan (2002), and Jozami (2003). 
23 I avoid the term ‘multitude’, which has been used to characterize this short episode of 
generalized protest that erupted largely without being induced by certain organizations (cf. 
Colectivo Situaciones 2001), as it is generally associated with the respective concept developed 
by Toni Negri and colleagues. In contrast to the latter approach, ‘unorganized publication ‘per 
se’’ emphasizes that the multitudinary protests did precisely not constitute a new ‘active social 
agent’’, ‘something organized’, ‘an active agent of self-organization’ (Negri 2002; on Argentina 
compare Cocco and Negri 2002). 
17 
24 For example, official urban poverty rose from 29.3 per cent in 1998 to 38.3 per cent in 
October 2001 and 53.0 per cent in May 2002, while at the same time the Gini coefficient of 
inequality deteriorated from 0.48 to 0.50 and 0.535 and real wages (indexed at constant prices) 
fell from 950to 860and 640(Wolff 2003b:4). At the peak of the crisis, independent sources 
regarded some 80 per cent of the Argentine population as being impoverished (Valente 2002). 
25 To make the argument clear, this analysis explicitly neglects some important idiosyncratic 
factors characterizing the Argentine case (Wolff 2003b): for example, the Argentine experience 
with a military dictatorship that was not only especially repressive but which also failed 
completely in the realms of economic and foreign policy thereby disqualifying any intervention 
of the military in the socio-political crisis. This specific experience (Levitsky 2001: 15) is  
reflected in the general support for democracy among the Argentine population, which stayed 
comparatively high even at the time of deep crisis (compare the results of the Latinobarómetro 
surveys at http://www.latinobarometro.org). 
26 For those export sectors that kept on earning US dollars, ‘pesification’ of debt meant an 
incredible debt cancellation precisely for those already favoured by devaluation of the peso. Yet, 
this political privilege let them accept a 20per cent tax on export earnings from agricultural 
commodities and hydrocarbons (retenciones) which became the central source for financing the 
social emergency programmes. 
27 For example, when Néstor Kirchner assumed the presidency in May 2003 urban poverty had 
reached 54.7 per cent (a level even higher than the 53.0 per cent seen in May 2002), while 
unemployment had fallen only very modestly from 21.5 per cent in May 2002 to 21.4 per cent in 
May 2003 (Wolff 2003b: 4). Further, the mentioned social subsidies of 150 Argentine pesos 
under the Plan Jefas y Jefes, though effective in containing social conflict, were way too small to 
cover a basic family basket of goods (calculated at 750pesos) and even on this reduced scale did 
not reach the proclaimed goal of universality (Muñoz 2004). 
28 Compare the results of the Latinobarómetro (see above). With the open crisis beginning in 
2001 the results for ‘satisfaction with democracy’ had plunged from 46% in 1999/2000 to 20% in 
2001. 
29 This is not to be read as a simple criticism of the Kirchner government which found itself 
trapped in a hardly solvable ‘two-level game’ (Robert Putnam) between the demands of societal 
majorities and the international ‘donors’ and creditors (not mentioning the domestic economic 
‘establishment’). 
30 Personal communication with representatives of various piquetero organizations in October 
and November of 2004. Among the more ‘radical’ protest groups, the strand emphasizing 
autonomy, the acceptance of heterogeneity and the (at least, de facto) retreat to the local sphere 
mirrors an alternative (but, at least in the short- to mid-run equally macro-politically stabilizing) 
response to those limits; compare the analyses of the Colectivo Situaciones (2002), a ‘militant 
research’ group. 
31 When also recognizing the transformation of Peronism (see above), itself a part of the trends 
described, it now becomes clear why the recent socio-political crisis remained far away from the 
‘traditional’ type of Argentine confrontation between, on one hand, the Peronist party, organized 
labour and the underclass and, on the other hand, conservative elites, middle sectors and the 
military. 
32 This term draws on Guillermo O’Donnell’s notion of ‘low-intensity citizenship’ (cf. 
O’Donnell 
1999: chapter 7) and the more socio-economically-based idea of ‘low-intensity democracy’ (Gills 
et al. 1993; Gills 2000; Robinson 2003: 53). 
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33 As Huber et al. (1997: 329) argued, the international context ‘though quite favourable for 
formal democracy, especially for regular elections, freedom of contestation, and universal 
suffrage, is very unfavourable for participatory and social democracy.’ Correspondingly, Jeffrey 
Stark (1998: 69) concludes: ‘Globalization both marginalizes and empowers. [...] The phenomena 
of globalization bring a contradictory amalgam of democratizing and de-democratizing forces’ 
(Stark 1998: 86, 88). This dual role of the international context is also expressed in the policies of 
democracy promotion and protection on the part of the established democracies of the ‘North’ 
(Cox et al. 2000). 
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